Besides infringement and preliminary ruling procedures, actions for annulment form a third important category of procedures brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union In sum, the analysis of this so far 'forgotten' type of procedure furthers our systematic understanding of policy development and competence allocation in the EU system.
Introduction
When the European Court of Justice (today Court of Justice of the European Union, CJEU) was formed, a key intention was for it to provide checks and balances to EU institutionsparticularly the High Authority. To this end, a third important category of procedures (besides preliminary ruling and infringement procedures) was created, whereby private and public, national as well as EU-level actors can seek judicial review of actions of EU institutions. Under Art. 263 TFEU the CJEU 'shall review the legality of legislative acts [other than recommendations and opinion]'. Most frequently, the ground on which these acts can be challenged is a 'lack of competence', or an action where no competences have been transferred.
Other grounds include the 'infringement of an essential procedural requirement', such as consultation, or 'of any rule of law relating to the […] application' of the Treaty, such as principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations and, finally, the 'misuse of powers'.
The literature has paid attention to annulment actions in cases where claimants at the national level have challenged the legality of actions by supranational actors, mostly the Commission (Adam et al., 2015; Bauer and Hartlapp, 2010) . I call such conflicts that emerge between the distinct levels of the EU multilevel system 'vertical litigation'. But annulment actions can also pit supranational actors against each other. The European Commission (Commission), the European Parliament (EP), the Council and possibly other EU institutions argue about the application of competences, policy arrangements and procedural practices. Since claimant and defendant are located at the same level of the EU multilevel system -the supranational -I call these 'horizontal litigation'. Despite its increasing empirical importance, both in absolute numbers and relative to vertical annulment conflicts, to date horizontal litigation has received virtually no scholarly attention. Consequently, many questions have been left unanswered.
When and where do annulment actions between the EU institutions occur? What are typical horizontal conflict-constellations and how likely are plaintiffs to win in front of the Court?
What are the effects of the rulings on the relationship and competence allocation between EU institutions in the contested areas? By exploring these questions, this article seeks to draw attention to this specific category of cases and to show how they matter to at least three different strands of literature. First, to European Integration research, where the allocation of competences between the EU institutions has been at the core of the research agenda. In this research strand, intergovernmentalists have traced competence allocation to Treaty reforms and to Member State interests (Moravcsik, 1991) . Others have highlighted that developments between the formal treaty changes should be viewed as endogenous shapers of competence allocation. This perspective is interested in understanding the allocation of power between Council, Parliament and Commission in legislative political bargains (Farrell and Héritier, 2004) and in the judicial arena (Jupille, 2007) . Rather than being restricted to formal Treaty negotiations, power shifts result from informal in-between dynamics. Horizontal annulment actions are a novel indicator for systematically addressing the informal dynamics of such interstitial power shifts. Going beyond punctual case law analysis (AETR case C-22/70 in Cremona, 2011 ; ECOWAS C-91/05 in Hillion and Wessel, 2009) 1 the new comprehensive dataset allows for the general identification of patterns of conflict over competences. It covers all annulment actions launched by an EU institution against another EU institution since 1957
and that have resulted in a judgment by the CJEU up until the end of 2017. Developments and distribution across policy fields provide new insights on how the Commission, and increasingly the EP, have shifted and expanded their powers through competence battles in the judicial arena.
Over time, some power shifts have become enshrined in new treaties. Such feedback effects underline that power shifts are a continuous game that actors play. Of course, the relationship between the EU institutions is neither exclusively, nor primarily, shaped by horizontal litigation. Other instruments certainly matter. And yet, horizontal annulment actions provide an important contribution to explaining factual and formal competence allocation between EU institutions.
Second, the exploration of patterns in annulment actions adds to a better understanding of implementation and conflict in the EU multilevel system. Here, preliminary rulings are instruments that allow us to address questions about the interpretation of EU legislation from the bottom-up (see, for example, Alter and Vargas, 2000) . Infringement procedures, on the other hand, allow the EU level to ensure the application of EU-legislation from the top-down (see Hartlapp and Falkner, 2009) . Infringements are particularly relevant in the fields of environment, mobility and transport, as well as for the internal market and taxation (European Commission, 2015, p. 15) . Meanwhile, preliminary rulings matter most in taxation, justice and home affairs and consumer protection (European Commission, 2015, p. 101) . Annulment actions concern conflict either between different levels, such as in agriculture and state aid (Bauer and Hartlapp, 2010) or between EU institutions (such as external affairs). Thus, complementing the existing sectoral patterns in preliminary and infringement actions with annulment actions advances our understanding of the incentives and opportunities that distinct 1 Cases are referred to by number and year and can be retrieved from the Courts website https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/ types of legal procedures before the CJEU hold for actors in different sectors of the multilevel system. Third, studies of the Court have typically assumed that the CJEU tends towards fostering integration (Burley and Mattli, 1993; Larsson and Naurin, 2016) . While different causal explanations exist for why this is the case, it is widely accepted that the respective legal procedures advance some interests over others. This can be seen either optimistically (Caporaso and Tarrow, 2009) or critically (Höpner and Schäfer, 2010) . So far, these debates have taken little interest in annulment actions. However, on the basis of a case study of annulment actions in the field of EU external affairs, this article explores how annulment rulings have contributed to a deepening of integration. By tracing the substantial conflicts and outcomes behind the aggregate patterns, it shows how the Commission and increasingly the EP have shifted and expanded supranational competences as well as their institutional prerogatives in external affairs -an area historically in the hands of Member States. Importantly, the Commission and EP as plaintiffs are somewhat more likely to win an annulment action than the Council as defendant. Thus, rather than considering annulment actions to be legalistic review instruments, they should be understood as strategic instruments used to systematically push competence extension. In cases where litigation runs between EU institutions, the question of who wins and who loses has a direct impact on their relationship.
The article proceeds as follows: In the next section, I outline my approach to horizontal litigation as procedural politics and discuss annulments as indicators of conflict and power shifts in the EU political system. I then introduce data, case selection and my empirical approach. Next, I turn to the analysis of actor constellations and successes in annulment actions at an aggregate level, before zooming in on the area of EU external affairs. Here, I link actor constellations to typical conflicts over competence and trace the effect of the rulings. The conclusion summarizes the main points and discusses their implications for the three literature strands identified above.
I. Conceptualizing Annulments as Indicators of Conflict and Power Shifts
According to the principle of conferral, all EU legislation must be based on a Treaty article that confers competences on the EU to act and prescribes a procedure to be followed. However, which treaty basis applies might be ambiguous. EU institutions can play a 'treaty base game' (Rhodes, 1995) where they strategically shift the legal reference point of an act, in order to increase their influence over the substance and to make successful adoption through a decision-making procedure more likely.
2 What is more, actions of EU institutions can stretch treaty articles, expanding factual competences beyond what is clearly assigned. Jupille (2004) has theorized the argument as 'procedural politics'. In contrast to big treaty bargains the contestation of competences takes place in day-to-day processes in the EU (Farrell and Héritier, 2007) . They are visible in 'the renegotiation or re-interpretation of incomplete institutional rules and policy decisions ' (Héritier, 2013, p. 234 ). When we translate this argument to the context of annulment actions, we can expect actors to play 'procedural politics' in order to keep or expand their prerogatives in EU policy-making. The specific actor constellation indicated by annulment actions should thus reflect underlying conflicts.
Where conflict lines produce systematic winners or losers, they will also feed back into the relationship between institutions. I expect successes in horizontal annulment actions to cause shifts in the relationship and relative power between EU institutions outside of treaty changes.
Such shifts can occur at the level of formal or informal institutions. At the moment of treaty change, they might translate into new or reformed articles altering formal procedural rules.
Consequently, we can understand the dynamics of power shifts as endogenously shaping primary law.
II. Empirical Approach
The empirical basis of my argument is all annulment actions between EU institutions launched since the founding days of the EU. In these cases, the defendant is per definition always an EU institution, most importantly the EP, the Commission or the Council. In horizontal conflicts between institutions, the plaintiff is also an EU institution. I set up a new comprehensive dataset that contains 147 annulment actions. Accordingly, external affairs is the area with the highest number of annulment cases (47 cases, 32 per cent). The second most frequent area is 'staff regulation and institutional provisions' (22 cases, 16 per cent), followed by environment and energy as well as justice and home affairs (14 and 15 cases, respectively, with the latter seeing a substantial hike over the last 3 years), agriculture and fisheries (11 cases), community budget (8 cases), state aid (8 cases) and taxes (6 cases). The number of annulment cases is negligible in all other policy fields. Based on this cross-policy distribution I chose external affairs as the subject matter of a closer case study.
Here, I read all rulings in detail, combined with other primary and secondary sources. I also conducted six expert interviews to explore causes and effects behind the court cases in more depth and used insights from the advisory procedure as background material. 4 These semistructured interviews were carried out between February and June 2016 with officials from policy departments and legal services in all EU institutions as well as national administrations involved in procedures before the CJEU (see the List of Interviews).
Two questions need to be addressed before we turn to an analysis of the empirical material.
They concern the validity of litigation as an indicator for conflict over competences and the relevance of conflict in policy-making. First, does litigation reflect conflict over competences or are participants driven by other motivations? For a large-N study, a hands-on approach is to analyze whether conflict over competences and prerogatives mattered to the participants in the cases of interest. To this end, I looked at the claims brought forward by the EU institution approaching the CJEU. Competence struggles seem to be at the root of all rulings in the field of external affairs: all 47 cases either contained the term 'legal basis' in the summary title or the text explicitly made reference to distinct treaty articles and related procedures, with one EU institution questioning the applicability of one treaty article and suggesting another legal basis.
The second question that needs to be addressed is whether the phenomenon I am interested in is actually relevant. Do EU institutions battle over the execution of external powers in their dayto-day policy-making? This is difficult to answer, since of course we do not know how many 
III. Aggregate Patterns in Horizontal Litigation
Above we established that annulment cases are indicators of conflict over competences and prerogatives in the EU multilevel system. Thus, patterns in horizontal litigation can provide insights about developments over time and about the constellation of claimants and defendants in front of the CJEU.
Development Over Time
Figure 1 displays all horizontal annulment actions that have resulted in a judgment by the CJEU from 1957 until today. In correspondence with the CJEU's increasing caseload overall, the dotted line shows an upward trend in the number of annulment actions from the 1970s onward.
However, as the solid line shows, the trend is marked by substantial up-and downward swings.
In the early years of integration, the EU institutions did not use their right to initiate actions for annulment against each other. The first case wasn't launched until 1970, and even then annulment actions remained exceptional for another two decades. Where conflict over competences between EU institutions did exist, it was not carried out in front of the CJEU. It is only in the second half of the 1980s, after the adoption of the Single European Act, that horizontal litigation gains frequency. 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 external affairs (cases closed) all (cases closed)
policies (Bauer and Hartlapp, 2010) . Following this argument, the first peak (1989, 8 The overall picture is partly shaped by annulment actions in the field of external affairs (columns in Figure 1 ). External affairs comprise diverse EU activities directed to the exterior, such as trade, security policy and defence policy. External affairs concern 'core state power' (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2013) loggerheads with a common interest to maximize power over bargaining and to 'speak with a single voice' in the international realm (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 1999; also Smith, 2017 Ultimately, in the field of external affairs, it is often difficult to decide whether an exemption applies or an international agreement spans different treaty articles or former pillars of the treaties. This allows for considerable room for interpretation on how to implement articles, for example when it comes to the specific prerogatives. Interviewees explained that surges in Figure 1 result from the legal uncertainty introduced with the Maastricht Treaty and particularly with the Lisbon Treaty in 'the vast area of external affairs' (Interviews COM_2, CONS_1, EP_1). Thus, treaty changes are followed by periods of greater legal uncertainty that seem to provide a breeding ground for competence conflicts, in turn leading to more litigation. To learn which actors challenge each other in these conflicts, who wins, and who loses, I now turn to conflict-constellations and success rates.
Conflict-Constellations and Success Rates
6 'Implied powers' means that, where a policy field is occupied by existing Union legislation (preemption) and a Union objective is attained by internal and external powers (effet utile), the Union is responsible for this policy aspect in external relations too. Given the similarities in patterns and conflict-constellations across all cases and within the field of external affairs, these actor constellations underline that EU institutions clearly and enduringly differ in their applicable supranational competences and institutional prerogatives.
Typically, the Commission and/or the EP call for the annulment of Council actions. The EP is less active than the Commission and somewhat less active in external affairs than across sectors.
The Council rarely steps on the scene as plaintiff, despite being challenged so frequently. These conflict-constellations show that factual competence allocation in the decision-making process shapes constitutional dialogue between EU institutions. Typically, the Commission acts as agenda setter and proposes a measure. It is only when the Council alters a proposal, that the conflict may become apparent. The Commission and/or the EP call upon the Court to annul a Council action. This turns the Council into a defendant rather than plaintiff in the annulment actions between institutions. What is more, Member States can bring annulment actions against other institutions, collectively or unilaterally, outside the Council structure. Such strategies may be less costly in terms of resources, offer more certainty about the strategy pursued, and explain why the Council so rarely acts as plaintiff. Similarly, as the role of the EP in the decision-making process changes over time, so do conflict patterns. The first action the Commission launched against the EP dates back to 2000, where it was testing the waters after the Maastricht Treaty had accorded the EP co-legislator competences. This shift from being a loyal ally of the Commission to a more distant player has been noted with regard to other developments in the EU too (see, for example, Ellinas and Suleiman, 2012, p. 21) . Consequently, the Commission litigates not only against the Council, but also against the EP in cases where EP and Council joint legislation has overstepped or wrongly allocated competences in the eyes of the Commission. In sum, these conflict-constellations underline that conflict lines remain mostly stable and typically do not concern all actors in equal part, although over time additional conflict-constellations may emerge. I now turn to the outcomes of the judgments.
To assess the outcomes of the judgments, I coded whether it was the plaintiff or the defendant that was ordered to bear the cost, information that is usually covered in the last paragraphs of a judgment. More cases were won by the complainant (79 cases, 50 per cent) than the defendant More strikingly, however, this picture of horizontal litigation shows notable differences to vertical litigation analyzed in previous studies. Outcomes in horizontal litigation are substantially more balanced. In annulments launched by Member States against the Commission, the Commission lost only in about 3 per cent of the cases (Bauer and Hartlapp: 204) . This means that horizontal annulments hold a higher uncertainty for actors in terms of the potential pay-offs. Consequently, the feedback effects for EU policies, regarding the relation of actors and on formal power shifts, are much more difficult to anticipate. Against this background, in the following section I trace conflicts and feedback effects through specific case studies. 7 The remaining cases are split judgments (3 cases) or cases where no information was available -for example the judgment had been deleted from the register (25 cases). 
IV. Substantiating Conflicts: Zooming into External Policies

Commission versus Council
The annulment. The CJEU's judgment was split, with neither side winning the case. This is typical for this type of conflict over prerogatives. Rulings seem to intentionally promote co-operation by appealing to Member States' and Commission's common responsibility for 'sincere cooperation' in negotiation, conclusion and implementation of international agreements. Thus, feedback effects here are more nuanced than for other lines of competence conflict.
Interestingly, interview evidence points toward a causal link between these outcomes and an increasingly critical public assessment of 'EU only' international agreements. An interviewee mentioned the controversial debate on the involvement of national parliaments for TTIP and CETA negotiations (Interview D_4). It remains an open empirical question whether this trend will stabilize and how it will affect the relationship between the EU institutions. Moreover, while in absolute numbers, conflicts over procedural competences have been limited in horizontal litigation, their relevance has increased over time.
Commission versus Parliament
The constellation that has the Commission lodging complaints against the EP is not very frequent in external affairs. The cases concern regulations adopted jointly by Council and 
European Parliament versus Commission
Due to a lack of institutional rights to launch annulment actions in much of the investigation period, only three cases in our sample pit the EP against the Commission. They all deal with budgetary aspects of humanitarian aid and development co-operation. In this area, Member
States and the Community share powers. This reduces the influence of the EP (Art. 40 TFEU, ex. 47 TEC). Yet, over time, and related to the AETR ruling, the EP became inclined to use its budgetary prerogative to exert influence over the implementation of agreements with budgetary implications (Corbett et al., 2011, p. 226) . Two ( (Riddervold and Rosén, 2016, pp. 7-8; Terpan and Saurugger, 2017) . So far, this has not been codified in primary law, but the outcome clearly alters the relationship of the institutions by expanding the EP's factual competences.
In sum, the Commission lodges complaints against the Council to expand exclusive competences over shared ones and -given its success in doing so -more recently also over procedural prerogatives when negotiating international agreements. Parliament has sought to advance its say in external affairs across the pillars by launching annulment actions against the Council over (lacking) consultation and, against the Commission over its budgetary prerogative. Returning to the expectations developed above, systematically differing success rates in horizontal annulment actions should have an effect on the relationship and relative power between EU institutions. In this sense, all of the above constellations clearly show 'important consequences for actors' power and policy outcomes' (Jupille, 2004, p. 304) at an informal level, such as by altering procedures. In two conflict-constellations (Commission v.
Council and Commission v. EP), rulings even empowered the claimant formally. Here, power shifts achieved through litigation became legally enshrined when a new treaty was negotiated.
Conclusion and Implications
In this article I explored horizontal litigation in the form of annulment actions launched by one EU institution against another EU institution. Conflicts were conceptualized as a contestation of competences, where legal proceedings offer opportunities for actors to maximize influence.
At an aggregate level, the specific plaintiff/ defendant constellation in annulment actions should thus provide insight into the underlying conflict structures. Differences in success rates should, in turn, lead to shifts in the relationship and relative power between EU institutions that may translate into formal power shifts when new treaties are negotiated.
A combination of quantitative analysis and case study evidence from the field of external affairs has showed that annulment actions have increased since the 1970s and, particularly, since the 1990s. With complex interests in the field, as well as an increase in competence transfers over time, conflicts emerged in cases where treaties failed to provide legal certainty. The specific litigant constellation, in turn, was strongly influenced by the role actors hold in EU policymaking, for instance whether they can veto decision-taking. Commission and EP litigate most frequently, while the EP has become more active over time. In the vast majority of cases, both institutions challenge the Council, but increasingly also each other. These litigation constellations are rather stable, underlining that the analysis provides a general understanding of the conflict structure in the field and of the strategic use actors make of litigation to expand or hold on to their competences and prerogatives. These systematic, yet nuanced insights into the evolution of conflict over competences in the EU multilevel system contribute to an understanding of the procedural politics that shape European Integration between formal treaty changes and outside the legislative arena (Farrell and Héritier, 2007; Jupille, 2007) .
In addition, the analysis of horizontal litigation provides fresh insights for research on implementation and conflict in the multilevel system. Annulment actions are particularly relevant in external affairs and increasingly in justice and home affairs -thus, they go beyond the regulatory polity of the EU and turn our attention to core state powers in front of the CJEU (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2013) . While this is interesting in and of itself, it also contrasts with the sectoral patterns discovered in existing implementation analyses that look at preliminary rulings and infringement actions. Here, insights from the analysis of annulment actions can complement our understanding of sectoral patterns. And it can provide the basis for an analysis of the factors that shape litigant decisions to use one or the other procedure before the CJEU.
Finally, it is noteworthy that success rates of plaintiffs and defendants are much more balanced in the horizontal litigation studied in this article than they are in vertical litigation. This could render them an interesting set of legal actions through which to revisit claims about court agency (recently Terpan and Saurugger, 2017) as well as court constraint and legislative override (Carrubba et al., 2008 (Carrubba et al., , 2012 Stone Sweet and Brunell, 2012 
